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This paper analyzes the effects of a land rent tax on capital formation and foreign 
investment in a life-cycle small open economy with endogenous labor-leisure choices. 
Differently from the previous literature, the consequences of land taxation critically 
depend on how the tax proceeds are used by the government. A land tax depresses 
capital formation, crowds out foreign investment and pulls up national wealth and 
consumption when consumers are lump-sum compensated for the tax. If the proceeds 
from taxation were used for financing un-productive government expenditure, land 
taxation would be neutral in its effects on capital stock, nonhuman wealth and labor. 
When the tax proceeds are used to reduce labor taxes, the land tax exerts ambiguous 
effects on capital stock and manhours, and spurs nonhuman wealth accumulation. 
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1 Introduction
In a non-altruistic OLG closed economy, where land serves as an input as
well as an asset, and land and labor are inelastically supplied, a tax on land
rent is associated with higher capital stock and output per person in the
steady state. This result is discovered by Feldstein (1977). The rationale
for this result is that a land tax hike, by initially reducing the value of land,
diverts savings away from land into real capital, therefore spurring capital
accumulation and temporarily output growth. The increase in capital stock
in turn lowers the real interest rate (whose fall, if suﬃciently strong, may
even induce a rise in the land price in the after-shock equilibrium) and raises
the marginal productivity of land as well as the wage rate. Steady state
financial wealth, consumption and welfare rise.1
The positive eﬀect of the land rent tax on capital formation, which can
be denominated the ”Feldstein eﬀect”, is grounded in the portfolio choices.
Since capital and land are the only assets of the economy, any ”flight from
1The primary purpose of the Feldstein (1977) analysis was to demonstrate that within
an intertemporal setting, where the supply of capital is endogenous through saving deci-
sions, the Ricardian proposition that a tax on pure rent is unshifted is violated. Calvo-
Kotlikoﬀ-Rodriguez (1979) demonstrate that the Feldstein findings depend on the non-
Ricardian (in the demographic sense) structure of the economy considered, by showing
that in a Barro-Ramsey economy a tax on land rent is fully capitalized in the price of land
and no tax shifting occurs as originally predicted by Ricardo. See also Kotlikoﬀ-Summers
(1987).
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land”, determined by the land rent tax, is by necessity a ”flight into real
capital”.2
In a finite-lived small open economy facing a perfect world capital market
and having a fixed labor supply, savings diverted from land by a rise in land
taxation are not canalized into real capital. This is shown by Eaton (1988)
who discovers that within such an economy a compensated land tax leaves
capital stock, domestic output and non-land input prices unaﬀected. The
land tax however reduces the price of land, crowds out foreign investment and
hence raises national income as well as consumption and welfare of nationals.3
There is nothing surprising in these findings. In fact, even if the economy
analyzed by Eaton (1988) is in principle a three-asset economy (as net foreign
assets are introduced in the asset menu of savers in addition to physical
capital and land), it de facto works as a two-asset economy, as capital stock is
tied down by the given world interest rate. Within a small open economy with
perfect capital mobility, the portfolio mechanism discovered by Feldstein is
still in existence but implies that the ”flight from land” necessarily determines
a ”flight into foreign assets”, given the capital stock black-out.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the eﬀects of a land rent tax
on capital formation and foreign investment within a life-cycle small open
economy where capital stock is unblocked from the world interest rate uni-
2The ”Feldstein eﬀect” is independent of alternative uses of land tax revenues. Whether
land tax proceeds are lump-sum transferred to consumers or spent to increase unproductive
government spending or used to reduce labor taxes is inconsequential for the qualitative
consequences of the land tax on the resource allocation.
3The eﬀects of land taxation is only one of the multiple issues investigated by Eaton
(1988).
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lateral peg by considering endogenous labor-leisure choices. By extending
the analysis provided by Eaton (1988), we investigate whether the direction
of the ”flight from land” can involve real capital other than net foreign as-
sets, when the world interest rate fixes capital intensity, but no longer capital
stock as both capital and labor are endogenously determined.
We discover that the consequences of land rent taxation diﬀer substan-
tially from those predicted by Feldstein (1977) and Eaton (1988) and criti-
cally depend on how the tax proceeds are used by the government.
Land taxation does not spur capital accumulation as in a closed econ-
omy, but instead depresses capital formation and economic growth when
consumers are lump-sum compensated for the tax. In this case, as in Eaton
(1988), the ”Feldstein eﬀect” takes the morphology of foreign investment
displacement as a mirror-like reflection of the land value fall; when labor
supply is endogenous, however, capital stock bears part of the burden of the
macroeconomic adjustment in an anti-Feldstein direction. Labor and domes-
tic output are reduced by the shock, while nonhuman wealth and national
income are increased. The cause of the rise in financial wealth and con-
sumption lies in the intergenerational redistribution of resources that aﬀects
the pattern of the life-cycle savings of an individual and, as a result, the
aggregate savings in the economy.
If instead the resources from taxation were used for financing unproduc-
tive government expenditure, land taxation would be neutral in its eﬀects on
capital stock and aggregate wealth, because no income redistribution between
living generations and still unborn generations occurs. Welfare of nationals is
not aﬀected by the land tax. In this case the fall in the land price stemming
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from higher taxation only implies a reduction in foreign investment.
When the tax proceeds are used to reduce labor income taxes, land taxa-
tion exerts ambiguous eﬀects on capital stock and manhours, while it raises
domestic wealth and aggregate consumption.
2 The model
Consider a small open economy populated by finite-lived consumers. This
economy produces a single tradable good, which is perfectly substitutable
with the foreign-produced good, and has access to a perfect world capital
market. Domestic production is obtained by using capital, land and labor.
Domestic assets, namely real capital and land, are partly owned by nationals
and partly by foreigners.4
The consumers’ behavior is obtained by using the OLG demographics
with uncertain lifetime and no bequest motives formulated by Yaari (1965)
and Blanchard (1985), extended to incorporate endogenous labor-leisure choices,
as in Phelps (1994, ch. 16).5 Agents face a constant mortality rate θ. New co-
horts are born continuously. As the birth rate is assumed to equal the death
rate, population, composed of cohorts of diﬀerent ages, remains constant and
hence can be normalized to one.
Assuming logarithmic preferences, the demand-side of the economy is
4It could be alternatively assumed without altering the equilibrium that the stock of
capital and land are owned entirely by domestic residents, who could always borrow abroad
to bring about the current portfolio allocation.
5The analysis of Eaton (1988) is instead based on the Samuelson-Diamond specification
of the overlapping-generations structure.
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described by the following aggregate relationships6
.
C= (r∗ − ρ)C − αθ(θ + ρ)V d (1a)
1− L = (1− α)C
α(1− τ)w (1b)
C+
.
V
d
= r∗V d + (1− τ)wL+ Z (1c)
where C is aggregate consumption, V d financial wealth of nationals, L labor
hours, w real wage, Z lump-sum transfers from the government, r∗ the given
world interest rate, ρ the exogenous rate of time preference, τ the labor
income tax rate and α ² (0, 1) a preference parameter.
Equation (1a) describes the law of motion of consumption. It derives
from the Blanchard-Yaari intertemporal arbitrage condition asserting that
the rate of return on nonhuman wealth, r∗, must equal the rate of return on
consumption, given by the subjective discount rate plus the relative change in
consumption plus a premium proportional to the wealth-consumption ratio.7
Equation (1b) is a Cobb-Douglas labor supply, while relation (1c) represents
consumers’ aggregate budget constraint.
Financial wealth of domestic residents is composed of two perfectly sub-
stitutable assets, i.e. physical capital Kd and unimproved land T d; that is
6The derivation of sub-system (1) is described in Appendix A of the Mathematical
Supplement.
7As the stock of financial wealth held by nationals is assumed to be strictly positive,
the steady state equilibrium requires r∗ > ρ. This condition guarantees that individuals
save initially more and have an increasing profile of consumption.
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V d = Kd + qT d
where q is the price of land.
After-tax rates of return of perfectly substitutable assets must satisfy the
following relationship
r∗ =
(1− λ)R
q
+
.
q
q
(2)
where λ is a proportional tax rate on land rent, R represents the land reward
and perfect foresight has been assumed.
Domestic output Y is produced by competitive firms through the follow-
ing well-behaved and linearly homogeneous production function:
Y = F (K,T, L)
where K and T represent total capital stock and land, respectively. Factors
of production are complementary in the Edgeworth sense.
Total capital and land are defined as
K = Kd +Kf (3a)
T = T d + T f (3b)
where Kf and T f are capital and land owned by foreigners, respectively.
First-order conditions for maximum profit entail
FK(K,T, L) = r
∗ (4a)
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FT (K,T,L) = R (4b)
FL(K,T,L) = w (4c)
The economy has a fixed endowment of unimproved land,
∼
T , fully used in
production. Land endowment is normalized to one, i.e.
∼
T= 1.
Government uses revenues from taxing land rents and labor income to
finance lump-sum transfers to consumers and unproductive public spending
G; that is
λRT + τwL = Z +G (5)
The current account gives the rate of accumulation of foreign investment:
.
B= C+
.
K +G− Y + r∗B (6)
where B denotes foreign investment, i.e. the value of capital and land held
by foreigners, defined as
B = Kf + qT f (7)
The full model of the economy is obtained by combining the optimality
conditions for consumers and firms together with the equilibrium condition
on factor markets and the relevant equations of accumulation.
Our study of the macroeconomic consequences of land taxation is only
concerned with a situation of steady state equilibrium.
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3 Land taxation and resource allocation
Three alternative policy-experiments concerning the eﬀects of a parametric
change in λ are studied: one in which the government distributes the revenues
from taxation to consumers in a lump-sum fashion, one in which the addi-
tional tax proceeds are used for financing an increase in public expenditure,
and one in which land tax revenues are employed to reduce the labor income
tax rate.
3.1 Lump-sum distribution of land tax revenues
In this experiment, the rise in the land tax is accompanied by the lump-sum
distribution of the land tax proceeds. Government expenditure and the labor
income tax rate are fixed at
∼
G and
∼τ respectively.
In the present economy, the marginal productivity of capital is fixed by
the world interest rate according to equation (4a). From (4a), we obtain
L= l(K), l
0 > 0 (8)
where overbars denote long-run values and l0 = −FKK
FKL
> 0.
Substituting (8) into (1b) for L, we can express consumption in terms of
capital stock and the labor income tax rate as follows
C= c(K,
∼τ), c
K
< 0, c∼τ < 0 (9)
where c
K
= −
α(1− ∼τ)
h
(1− L)Φ− FLFKK
i
(1− α)FKL
< 0, c∼τ = −
α(1− L)FL
(1− α) < 0
and Φ = FKKFLL − F 2KL > 0.
From equation (1a), the Blanchard-Yaari consumption function is derived
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C=
αθ(θ + ρ)
(r∗ − ρ)
³
K + q − B
´
(10)
where K + q − B=V d .
The current account balance implies that
C +
∼
G= r∗
³
K + q − B
´
+ FL L +λFT (11)
Substituting (10) into (11) for K + q − B and using (8), we obtain
C=
αθ(θ + ρ)
[αθ(θ + ρ)− r∗(r∗ − ρ)]
·
h(K,λ)−
∼
G
¸
(12)
where h(K,λ) = FL L +λFT , hK = −
h
(1− λ) L Φ+ FLFKK
i
FKL
, hλ = FT > 0
and αθ(θ + ρ) > r∗(r∗ − ρ).
Diﬀerentiating equations (9) and (12) yields
d K
dλ
=
αθ(θ + ρ)FT
∆
d C
dλ
=
αθ(θ + ρ)FT cK
∆
where ∆ = [αθ(θ + ρ)− r∗(r∗ − ρ)] c
K
− αθ(θ + ρ)h
K
.
Saddle-point stability of the steady state equilibrium is satisfied as long
as ∆ < 0.8 Thus a compensated rise in the land tax leads to lower capital
stock and higher consumption. The reduction of capital goes together with
a contraction of labor hours from (8), while the rise in consumption is ac-
companied by an expansion of national wealth from (10). The reduction of
8The dynamic properties of the model are discussed in Appendix B of the Mathematical
Supplement.
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capital implies that the before-tax return on land falls, while the wage rate
rises.9 The price of land falls more than the capitalized amount of the tax
because of the reduction of the marginal productivity of land. Moreover,
since domestic wealth K + q is reduced and national wealth K + q − B is
increased, a reduction of foreign investment takes place.
In this setup, the eﬀects of land taxation on financial wealth and consump-
tion deriving from the non-Ricardian demographic structure of the economy
are not surprising, even if they are greatly simplified, compared to the closed
economy, by the capital price invariance. What turns out to be rather un-
conventional in this open economy environment are the consequences upon
the factors of production.
The rationale for the eﬀects on financial wealth and consumption, and the
reverse ”Feldstein eﬀect” on capital stock is as follows. When there are finite
lives with new births, a higher compensated land tax, implying greater lump-
sum transfers distributed by the government to consumers, causes a redistri-
bution of income from those who consume more and save less (the ”older”
ones) to those who consume less and save more (the ”younger” ones). This
leads to higher aggregate savings and financial wealth accumulation is there-
fore spurred. The rise in financial wealth brings aggregate consumption up.
Higher consumption induces a higher demand for leisure and a lower supply
of labor. Manhours are therefore reduced. Since the marginal productivity
of capital is given, and labor and capital are Edgeworth complements, lower
labor hours imply lower capital stock.10
9This is because we have, once (8) is taken into account, that R= R(K) and w= w(K),
where R0 = L
Φ
FKL
> 0 and w0 = − Φ
FKL
< 0.
10Although the drop of capital stock increases the wage rate, the consumption-to-wage
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3.2 Compensatory increase in government expenditure
When land tax revenues are used to finance an increase in government expen-
diture, the implications of the land tax can be easily understood as follows.
Equation (11) can be re-written by using the goverment budget constraint
(5) as
C= r
∗
³
K + q − B
´
+ (1− ∼τ)FL L +
∼
Z (13)
where
∼
Z represents the exogenous lump-sum transfers.
Using (13) together with (10), we obtain
C=
αθ(θ + ρ)
[αθ(θ + ρ)− r∗(r∗ − ρ)]
·
j(K,
∼τ)+
∼
Z
¸
(14)
where j(K,
∼τ) = (1− ∼τ)FL L, jK = −
(1− ∼τ)(L Φ+ FLFKK)
FKL
and j∼τ =
−FL L<0.
Equations (9) and (14), which jointly determine K and C, are indepen-
dent of λ and G. Hence, a rise in the land tax rate accompanied by an
increase in government spending leaves capital stock and consumption un-
changed. Labor hours, national wealth, the before-tax land reward and the
wage rate also remain unaﬀacted. As the gross land rental R is constant, the
land price drops by exactly the fall in 1 − λ . Hence, the land rent tax is
fully capitalized in the price of land.
Since capital stock does not change and the price of land is reduced, for-
eign investment must fall in order to keep national wealth constant. More-
over, while domestic output remains constant, national income is increased.
ratio is driven up as consumption increases more than the wage rate.
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The increase in national income is entirely absorbed by the government.
Welfare of nationals remains unaltered.11
Thus, when the government budget is balanced through the endogenous
adjustment of government expenditure, long-run capital stock becomes inde-
pendent of the land tax, since the intergenerational redistribution of income
seen above is absent and so are the eﬀects on aggregate savings, financial
wealth, consumption and welfare.
3.3 Compensatory reduction in τ
Suppose now that the increase in the land tax is matched by the endogenous
change in the labor tax rate so as to keep the government budget balanced.
Using the government budget constraint (5) together with equations (4)
and (8), we obtain
d τ
dλ
= − FT
FL L
+Π
d K
dλ
where Π =
h
τ (L Φ+ FLFKK)− λ L Φ
i
FL L FKL
.12
From (9) and (12), after using the above expression for
d τ
dλ
, we get
d K
dλ
= −
αFT
h
θ(θ + ρ)(α− L)− (1− L)r∗(r∗ − ρ)
i
(1− α) L Λ
d C
dλ
=
(1− τ)αθ(θ + ρ)FLFTFKK
(1− α) L ΛFKL
11In this compensatory finance circumstance, the hypothesis of endogenous labor-leisure
choices has no implications for the eﬀects of λ on the resource allocation. Our findings
confirm those obtainable in a small open economy with an inelastic labor supply.
12If a Cobb-Douglas production function were used, Π would be unambiguously negative.
14
where Λ = [αθ(θ + ρ)− r∗(r∗ − ρ)] (c
K
+Πcτ)− αθ(θ + ρ)hK and α >L .
Thus, a rise in the land tax exerts an ambiguous eﬀect on capital stock
and a positive eﬀect on consumption, since Λ < 0, as a necessary and suﬃ-
cient condition for having saddle-point stability of the steady state.13 Also
the eﬀects on manhours, the pre-tax land reward and the wage rate are am-
biguous. Financial wealth is instead pulled up by the rise in land taxation.
The ambiguity of the land tax eﬀects on capital and labor depends on two
contrasting eﬀects that are at work in this case-study. These eﬀects derive
from the OLG demographics with new entries, on the one hand, and the
consumption-leisure substitution eﬀect, on the other hand.
The rise in λ, by inducing a reduction of the wage income tax, redistrib-
utes income between the living generations and the yet to be born ones. This
mechanism, which works through a human wealth channel, leads to higher
aggregate savings;14 the stock of financial wealth is therefore expanded. Con-
sequently, consumption is driven up and labor supply is reduced. On the
other hand, the rise in λ, implying for a given capital stock an increase in
the after-tax wage because of the fall of τ , brings about a fall in the leisure-
consumption ratio. This causes a substitution away from leisure toward labor
and consumption. The induced rise in labor supply stimulates capital from
(8). Thus the overall eﬀect of the land tax hike on equilibrium manhours and
13This is demonstrated in Appendix C of the Mathematical Supplement.
14Long-run aggregate human wealth is: H=
(1− τ) w +
∼
Z
(r∗ + θ)
(see Appendix A of the
unpublished Mathematical Supplement). From the definition of H, it is clear that the
intergenerational mechanism brought into action by the induced change in τ is the same
as the one activated by a change in lump-sum transfers (seen in Sub-section 3.1).
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capital stock is determined by which of these two antitethic eﬀects dominate.
From a mechanical perspective, it can be observed that, since consump-
tion and the after-tax wage are increased by the fall in τ , the net eﬀect of
λ on labor and hence capital depends, according to (1b), on whether the
consumption-to-after-tax-wage ratio increases or not. If the eﬀect of the
land tax on
C
(1− τ) w is positive, namely consumption rises more than net
wage, labor hours fall and capital stock is contracted, since the intergener-
ational redistributive eﬀect dominates the substitution eﬀect; in this case,
the qualitative consequences on the whole system are the same as those seen
in Subsection 3.1. If instead, the after-tax wage rate increases more than
consumption, leisure is reduced while labor is stimulated as the magnitude
of the substitution eﬀect prevails over the magnitude of the intergenerational
redistributive eﬀect; the rise in manhours in turn increases capital stock.
Foreign investment may either rise or fall.
4 Conclusions
This paper has investigated the consequences of taxing a fixed asset, i.e.
unimproved land, on wealth accumulation and economic growth within a
small open economy model that incorporates overlapping-generations with
new births and an endogenous labor supply.
We have shown that the hypothesis of inelastic labor choices is non-
innocuous for the economic growth neutrality of a land tax obtained by Eaton
(1988), since in such a case capital stock is pinned down by the exogenous
world interest rate. The consequences of land taxation upon the employ-
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ment of production factors change substantially when labor-leisure choices
become elastic. In fact, an endogenous labor supply removes the capital stock
black-out and introduces permanent eﬀects of land taxation on capital stock
and labor hours, by making the interaction among financial assets (namely
capital, land and foreign assets) fully operative.
We depart from the Feldstein (1977) and Eaton (1988) findings, firstly
because the use of tax proceeds makes a fundamental diﬀerence for the final
eﬀects of land taxation on the resource allocation and secondly because of
the consequences on capital accumulation and economic growth. While a
pure ”Feldstein eﬀect” remains valid merely in terms of nonhuman wealth,
a reverse ”Feldstein eﬀect” on capital stock is obtained, when consumers are
lump-sum compensated for the tax; in this circumstance, foreign investment
is crowded out, while national wealth and consumption rise.
When the land tax is accompanied by the endogenous adjustment of
government expenditure, no eﬀects on capital stock, hours worked and non-
human wealth are registered, whereas foreign investment is reduced by the
fall in the land price. In this case the hypothesis of an endogenous labor sup-
ply is inconsequential for the eﬀects of land taxation on the macroeconomic
equilibrium.
Finally, a change in land taxation coupled with a compensatory change
in the wage tax produces ambiguous eﬀects on capital and manhours, while
financial wealth and consumption rise.
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MATHEMATICAL SUPPLEMENT
Appendix A
Microeconomics of the demand-side
Here, the microeconomic derivation of the aggregate behavior of con-
sumers, namely equations (1) of the text, is provided.
Assuming that the individual utility is logarithmic in consumption, c,
and leisure,
∼
l −l (where
∼
l is time endowment and l represents labor hours
supplied), at each instant t a consumer born at time s ≤ t solves the following
problem
max
Z ∞
t
½
α ln c(s, j) + (1− α) ln
·∼
l −l(s, j)
¸¾
exp[−(θ + ρ)(j − t)]dj (A.1)
subject to the instantaneous budget constraint
d
dt
vd(s, t) = (r∗ + θ)vd(s, t) + (1− τ)w(t)l(s, t) + z(s, t)− c(s, t) (A.2)
and the solvency condition precluding Ponzi schemes
lim
j→∞
vd(j, t) exp[−(r∗ + θ)(j − t)] = 0 (A.3)
where vd(s, t) and z(s, t) denote nonhuman wealth and lump-sum transfers
of a consumer born at time s; θ the mortality rate (exogenous), ρ the rate of
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time preference (exogenous), r∗ is the world interest rate (exogenous), w(t)
hourly real wage, τ the proportional tax on labor income, and α a positive
preference parameter.
The optimality conditions for the individual problem (A.1)-(A.3) are
c(s, t) = α(θ + ρ)[vd(s, t) + h(s, t)]
∼
l −l(s, t) =
(1− α)c(s, t)
α(1− τ)w(t)
d
dt
c(s, t) = (r∗ − ρ)c(s, t)
where h(s, t) is the consumer’s human wealth, given by
h(s, t) =
Z ∞
t
[(1− τ)w(j) + z(s, j)] exp[−(r∗ + θ)(j − t)]dj
Aggregating over all the cohorts and omitting the time index, the demand-
side of the model can be expressed as
C = α(θ + ρ)(V d +H) (A.4a)
1− L = (1− α)C
α(1− τ)w (A.4b)
.
H= (r∗ + θ)H − (1− τ)w − Z (A.4c)
C+
.
V
d
= r∗V d + (1− τ)wL+ Z (A.4d)
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where capital letters denote aggregate variables of the corresponding indi-
vidual variables15 and aggregate time endowment has been normalized to
one.
By using equations (A.4a), (A.4c) and (A.4d), the Blanchard-Yaari equa-
tion of motion for consumption can be easily obtained:
.
C= (r
∗ − ρ)C − αθ(θ + ρ)V d (A.4a’)
Thus, the aggregate behavior of consumers can be described by the sub-
system (A.4a’), (A.4b) and (A.4d) as indicated in Section 2 of the paper.
15Each aggregate variable is defined as
X(t) =
Z t
−∞
x(s, t)λeλ(s−t)ds
where x(s, t) indicates a generic individual variable.
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Appendix B
Lump-sum distribution of tax revenues: Analysis of stability
The short-run model can be written as
.
C= (r∗ − ρ)C − αθ(θ + ρ)(K + q −B) (B.1a)
.
q= r∗q − (1− λ)FT (K,L) (B.1b)
.
B=
.
K +C +G− F (K,L) + r∗B (B.1c)
1− L = (1− α)C
α(1− ∼τ)FL(K,L)
(B.1d)
FK(K,L) = r
∗ (B.1e)
Since we are considering the case of a lump-sum distribution of tax
revenues, lump-sum transfers are obtained residually from the relationship:
Z = λFT (K,L)+
∼τ FL(K,L)L−
∼
G.
Equations (B.1d) and (B.1e) can be solved, once linearized around the
steady state, for L and K in terms of the dynamic variable C to yield
L = n(C), n0 < 0 (B.2a)
K = k(C), k0 < 0 (B.2b)
21
where n0 =
(1− α)FKK
Σ
= l0k0 =
l0
c
K
< 0, k0 = −(1− α)FKL
Σ
=
1
c
K
< 0,
Σ = α(1− τ)[(1− L)Φ− FLFKK ] > 0 and Φ = FKKFLL − F 2KL > 0.16
Substituting out the values of L and K from equations (B.2) into equa-
tions (B.1a)-(B.1c),17 the model can be reduced to the following system of
diﬀerential equations linearized around the steady state


.
C
.
q
.
B


=


j11 −αθ(θ + ρ) αθ(θ + ρ)
−(1− λ)Q0 r∗ 0
j31 −αθ(θ + ρ)k0 r∗ + αθ(θ + ρ)k0




C− C
q− q
B− B


(B.3)
where
j11 = r
∗ − ρ− αθ(θ + ρ)k0 > 0;
Q0 = FTKk0 + FTLn0 =
L Φ
c
K
FKL
< 0;
j31 = 1− r∗k0 − FLn0 + j11k0.
The transition matrix must have two positive eigenvalues associated with
the jump variables C and q, and one negative eigenvalue associated with the
predetermined variable B.18
16The expressions for l0 and c
K
, given in Subsection 3.1, are:
l0 = −FKK
FKL
> 0 and c
K
= −
α(1− ∼τ )
h
(1− L)Φ− FLFKK
i
(1− α)FKL
< 0.
17Note that equation (B.2b) is employed, once linearized, to eliminate both K and
.
K
from equations (B.1a)-(B.1c).
18Since C adjusts on impact, K (hence L) jumps instantaneously as well, provided we
assume, as in Mundell (1957) and Obstfeld (1989), that capital is instantaneously and
costlessly mobile across borders. By considering foreign investment B = Kf + qT f a
predetermined variable, we are implictly assuming that as q moves repentinely Kf adjusts
instantaneously as well, but in an opposite direction so as to leave B unchanged on impact
(note that T f is also predetermined).
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The determinant and the trace of the above Jacobian are
| J |= −r∗αθ(θ + ρ)
(
1− r
∗(r∗ − ρ)
αθ(θ + ρ)
− 1
c
K
[l0FL −
(1− λ) L Φ
FKL
]
)
;
tr(J) = 3r∗ − ρ > 0.
The determinant must be negative as a necessary and suﬃcient condition
for saddle-point stability since the trace is necessarily positive. This condition
implies that, once the relationship l0FL −
(1− λ) L Φ
FKL
= h
K
=
= −
h
(1− λ) L Φ+ FLFKK
i
FKL
is taken taken into account, the following in-
equality must hold
∆ = [αθ(θ + ρ)− r∗(r∗ − ρ)] c
K
− αθ(θ + ρ)h
K
< 0.
Therefore the condition ∆ < 0 ensures that the steady state equilibrium is
saddle-point stable as stated in Subsection 3.1.
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Appendix C
Compensatory reduction in τ : Analysis of stability
The complete short-run model is given by
.
C= (r∗ − ρ)C − αθ(θ + ρ)(K + q −B) (C.1a)
.
q= r∗q − (1− λ)FT (K,L) (C.1b)
.
B=
.
K +C +G− F (K,L) + r∗B (C.1c)
1− L = (1− α)C
α(1− τ)FL(K,L)
(C.1d)
FK(K,L) = r
∗ (C.1e)
τ = τ(K) (C.1f)
where τ 0 = Π =
h
τ (L Φ+ FLFKK)− λ L Φ
i
FL L FKL
.
Equation (C.1f) has been obtained by solving the government budget
constraint for τ .19
Equations (C.1d) and (C.1e) can be solved, after linearizing around the
steady state and taking (C.1f) into account, for L and K in terms of C as
follows
19The exogenous eﬀect of λ on τ has been omitted for simplicity.
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L = v(C), v0 < 0 (C.2a)
K = κ(C), κ0 < 0 (C.2b)
where v0 = l0κ0 = l
0
(c
K
+Πcτ)
< 0, κ0 = 1
(c
K
+Πcτ)
< 0,
c
K
= −
α(1− ∼τ)
h
(1− L)Φ− FLFKK
i
(1− α)FKL
< 0, cτ = −
α(1− L)FL
(1− α) < 0
and Φ = FKKFLL − F 2KL > 0.
Substituting out the values of L and K from equations (C.2) into equa-
tions (C.1a)-(C.1c), the model can be reduced to the following system of
diﬀerential equations linearized around the steady state


.
C
.
q
.
B


=


j11 −αθ(θ + ρ) αθ(θ + ρ)
−(1− λ)Q0 r∗ 0
j31 −αθ(θ + ρ)κ0 r∗ + αθ(θ + ρ)κ0




C− C
q− q
B− B


(C.3)
where
j11 = r
∗ − ρ− αθ(θ + ρ)κ0 > 0;
Q0 = FTKκ0 + FTLv0 =
L Φ
(c
K
+Πcτ)FKL
< 0;
j31 = 1− r∗κ0 − FLv0 + j11κ0.
The transition matrix must admit two positive eigenvalues associated
with C and q and one negative eigenvalue associated with B.
Since the trace of the coeﬃcient matrix in (C.3) is positive, the determi-
nant, given by
| J |= −r∗αθ(θ+ρ)
(
1− r
∗(r∗ − ρ)
αθ(θ + ρ)
− 1
(c
K
+Πcτ)
[l0FL −
(1− λ) L Φ
FKL
]
)
,
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must be negative. This condition is satisfied if the following expression
Λ = [αθ(θ + ρ)− r∗(r∗ − ρ)] (c
K
+Πcτ )− αθ(θ + ρ)hK < 0
is, as stated in Subsection 3.3, negative.20
20Note that the relationship l0FL −
(1− λ) L Φ
FKL
= h
K
has been used.
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